We characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets. The discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a "preference for flexibility" in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu. Other cases display varying levels of "choice aversion,"
Introduction
Observed individual choice is typically stochastic. Most of the theoretical literature on stochastic choice has focused on static models. Structural econometric models of aggregate dynamic decisions start by specifying a dynamic choice problem for each agent, where the agent is typically assumed to be dynamically sophisticated in the sense of correctly anticipating the way the probability distributions over his future actions depend on his actions today (Rust, 1987) .
This paper provides the first axiomatic characterization of stochastic choice in dynamic settings, where choices made today can influence the possible choices available tomorrow, and consumption may (but need not) occur in multiple periods. Our main goal is to better understand the issues involved in modeling an agent who makes random choices not only over actions with immediate consumption consequences but also over actions that can alter the choice sets that will be available in the future, when the agent's choice in each period is made taking her future randomizations into account.
Data on dynamic choice lets us distinguish between models of random choice that coincide in static settings, because these models have different implications for how the agent views his future randomizations over menus, and thus induce different choices between menus. In particular, standard models of dynamic random utility such as discounted logit generate a positive option value for each item that is added to a menu because each added item provides another chance for a good realization of the random shocks and has no downside. On the other hand, models of limited attention, implementation errors, or costly decision making all suggest that the agent may dislike adding at least some items. This leads us to propose a generalization of discounted logit called Discounted Adjusted Logit (DAL), where the attractiveness of menus is adjusted to reflect the agent's "choice aversion" and reduce or eliminate the option value of additional items.
To make this first step in characterizing dynamic stochastic choice we maintain the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption throughout the paper, so that static choice in our model is logit, and can be represented by a random utility model where the payoff shocks are i.i.d. with extreme value type-1 distributions, see e.g. Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992) . Although this assumption is restrictive, we maintain it here. This lets us focus on the new issues that arise when modeling stochastic choice in a dynamic setting, axiomatize the widely used discounted logit model 1 , and propose and characterize the generalization to DAL.
Concretely, in DAL the agent values combinations of current outcome z t and continuation menu A t+1 as
and then chooses each a t = (z t , A t+1 ) from the menu A t
where at has an extreme-value distribution. Every DAL is equivalent to logit in static decisions or when δ = 0, regardless of the value of κ. DAL with κ = 0 reduces to the usual form of discounted logit. The new parameter κ measures the agent's choice aversion, and is determined by the extent to which the agent wants to add new items to the menu. When κ = 0, the agent is choice loving in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu, as in the "preference for flexibility" of Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) .
Another special case of interest is κ = 1; here the agent wants to remove choices that are worse than average, as might be the case if the agent were worried about choosing them by accident or if the agent incurs "menu" or "consideration" costs that exactly offset the benefit of another random draw. 2 In addition to DAL, we present two alternative but equivalent representations. To motivate the representations and explain their equivalence it is useful to recall that there are several explanations in the literature for stochastic choice in static problems.
Random utility: Agents might maximize their expected utility given privately observed payoff shocks as in Thurstone (1927) , Marschak (1959) , McFadden (1973) , and Harsanyi (1973a) , so that even choices that are typically unappealing could be optimal when the payoff shock is large. Logit corresponds to payoff shocks that are i.i.d. with extreme value type-1 distributions; this functional form is the starting point for the discounted logit model.
Inattention: Agents might randomize as the result of error or inattention under a cost of attending to the decision. Here, paying no attention results in a uniform error distribution, and the agent faces a cost of paying attention in order to increase the probability of the desired outcome, as in van Damme (1991) and van Damme and Weibull (2002) . Static logit corresponds to the case where this cost function is the relative entropy of the choice distribution with respect to the uniform distribution.
In our dynamic setting, the relative entropy cost function corresponds to κ = 1 in an alternative representation we call Discounted Adjusted Entropy or DAE. In this case adding an equally-good item to a singleton menu has no effect on the menu's value, as the agent will choose to randomize uniformly and thus incur no attention cost while receiving an equivalent current outcome. As with DAL, all versions of DAE are equivalent to logit in static decisions, but the value of κ matters once there are two or more periods. In particular, DAE with κ = 0, where the cost function is the negative of the entropy of the choice probabilities, is equivalent to discounted logit and so is choice loving; here the preference for larger choice sets arises from the fact that larger choice sets have a higher maximum entropy. Ambiguity aversion: Agents might be uncertain about the rewards to each choice, and randomize in response to ambiguity-aversion. As shown by Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2013) this can lead to the agent acting as if their goal was to maximize the sum of expected utility and entropy (or some other convex function); thus this explanation for stochastic choice and the explanation based on inattention motivate representations with identical functional forms, including DAE as a the special case where IIA is satisfied. 3 Weighting function: Finally, observed choices might be the result of psychophysical "weighting functions," as in Luce (1959) , who characterized stochastic choice in static problems under the additional assumptions of positivity (all actions have positive probability) and IIA. Under these assumptions, the observed choice distribution can be generated by assigning weights W (a) to each action a, and then picking an action with probability equal to its share of the total weight; the term "psychophysical" reflects the idea that these weights correspond to the mental stimuli generated by the feasible actions. This motivation for random choice corresponds to our Discounted Adjusted Luce (DALu) representation.
As should be clear by now, this paper relates to several strands of the axiomatic decision theory literature, to foundational literature in game theory, and to empirical work on dynamic choice. We discuss these relationships in the concluding section, after we have developed our representations and the associated axioms.
Of these axioms, the most significant are: IIA (so that static choice is logit); a separability axiom that implies that preferences over future decision problems are independent of the outcome in the current period, and vice versa; a recursivity axiom that links current choice of menus for tomorrow to behavior when tomorrow arrives; and a replica invariance axiom that says roughly that how the agent feels about duplicating every item in a menu does not depend on the menu's elements or size. We also characterize the special case of κ = 0 (which corresponds to the usual discounted logit) with a more specific "aggregate recursivity" axiom, which says that menu A is more likely to be selected now than some other menu B if elements of A are more likely to be selected than elements of B when both are presented as an immediate decision next period. In contrast, DAE with κ = 1 corresponds to "average recursivity," where menu A is preferred if its elements are chosen with higher average probability. As in the deterministic case of Koopmans (1960) , additional assumptions are needed to arrive at a stationary discounted sum formulation.
In addition to its impact on preferences over menus at a given time, the choice-aversion parameter κ also influences whether the agent wants to make decisions as soon as possible or to postpone them: when κ = 0 the agent enjoys making decisions and so (because of discounting) prefers to decide early, while when κ ≥ 1 the agent views decisions as costly and wishes to postpone them. As we argue below, to the extent that people typically do prefer to postpone decisions this can be viewed as an additional reason to generalize DAL to allow for positive values of κ.
Dynamic Choice Problems
For any set S let K(S) be the collection of nonempty finite subsets of S, to be interpreted as the collection of possible choice problems. For any set S let ∆(S) be the collection of probability measures on S with finite support. Let ∆ n := ∆({1, . . . , n}).
We assume that time is discrete, t = 0, 1, . . . , T with T finite. We assume throughout that T > 0, that is, choices are observed in at least two time periods. Let Z be the set of all oneperiod outcomes. 4 In any period t, an individual choice problem is called a menu; we denote period t menus by letters A t , B t , C t , . . . and the space in which all menus live by M t . The elements of the menu are called actions and are denoted by a t , b t , c t , . . .; the space in which all actions live is denoted by A t . We construct the set of dynamic choice problems recursively. Let A T := Z and M T := K(A T ); in period T actions are synonymous with one-period outcomes because in the terminal period there is no future, and period T menus are just collections of one-period outcomes. Now we define the possible menus and actions in earlier time periods by A t := Z × M t+1 and M t := K(A t ). Thus, an action a t at time t is a pair (z t , A t+1 ) of a current outcome and a time-t + 1 menu, while a menu A t at time t is a finite set of such actions. For notational convenience, we set M T +1 = ∅ and use the convention that Z × M T +1 = Z.
It is important that the actions today can restrict future opportunities without having any impact on the current outcome; for example the agent might face the period T − 1 menu {(z, A T ), (z, A T )}. Moreover, the agent might face the choice at time T − 3 of whether to commit to her time-T outcome in period T − 2 or in period T − 1. As we will see, different values of κ predict different choices here; this is one advantage of allowing a general finite horizon as opposed to restricting the model to have only two time periods.
Definition 1 (Dynamic stochastic choice rule). A dynamic stochastic choice rule is a
For any A t ∈ M t , P t (A t ) is the probability distribution on actions that represents the stochastic choice from A t . 6 For notational convenience, we write P t [B t |A t ] to denote the probability that the chosen action will belong to the set B t when the choice set is
Note that the time periods in our model are data that is observed by the analyst, as opposed to the purely notional time periods in nested logit, which is an as-if representation of static choice. As we will see, observing how the choice probabilities vary with the times that decisions are made provides additional information about the agent's preferences that is unavailable in static models.
Our primitive is a dynamic stochastic choice rule P . However, it will be more convenient to express some of our questions using the notion of the stochastic preference t on A t , which is derived from P t as follows.
Definition 2 (Stochastic preference). Action a t is stochastically preferred to action b t at
. Given t we define induced stochastic preferences on Z and M t+1 as follows: z is stochastically preferred to w at time t, denoted
Under our basic axioms (to be introduced later), these stochastic preference relations are complete and transitive. All behavioral content expressed in terms of t can be formulated in terms of P t at the cost of making some expressions more cumbersome.
Choice Rules and their Representations
We study three equivalent representations of a dynamic stochastic choice rule. Each of these writes values as the sum of current payoff plus the discounted value of the expected continuation payoff, where the continuation payoff assigned to each menu is adjusted to account for its size.
The most familiar-looking of the representations is Discounted Adjusted Logit, which generalizes the standard discounted logit representation used to model dynamic individual choice in estimation problems.
Definition 3. A random variable has the extreme value distribution (with noise parameter 1),
Definition 4 (Discounted Adjusted Logit). P has a Discounted Adjusted Logit (DAL) representation iff there exist a utility function v : Z → R, discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), choice aversion parameter κ ≥ 0, and value functions U t :
such that for all t = 0, . . . , T , all A t , and all a t ∈ A t
where at ∼ iid EV (1). 7
In this representation, the terms correspond to payoff shocks that are observed by the decision maker but not by the analyst, as in static random utility models. 8 Note that these payoff shocks apply to every action, just as they do under the "Assumption AS" or equation (3.7) of Rust (1994) . As an example, suppose that a consumer first decides what size tuna fish can to buy and later decides how much to consume each day; then payoff shocks apply to each possible purchasing decision in period t = 0 as well as to consumption in subsequent periods, as in Hendel and Nevo (2006, p.1645) .
We call this sort of payoff shocks "shocks to actions," as opposed to the alternative model where payoff shocks apply only to a set of "immediate outcomes." Some aspects of this alternative approach have been studied in the decision theory literature, but a full characterization of dynamic stochastic choice along these lines remains elusive. 9 Additionally, the simplest version of this alternative model, in which the agent knows all future shocks from the outset, predicts purely deterministic choice in settings such as the purchasing decisions discussed above, which seems implausible and is impractical for empirical work. The model could generate stochastic decisions under the assumption that the agent gradually learns about future payoff shocks over time, but this would make it difficult or impossible to obtain closed form solutions, and so require computationally intensive numerical work. Thus we follow the empirical literature here and restrict attention to "shocks to actions." We explore one consequence of this modeling assumption in Section 5.4.
In the case κ = 0, the representation reduces to discounted logit. (More precisely, it is the simplest sort of discounted logit representation, as it does not include a state variable and assumes stationarity; we make these simplifications to focus on the issues related to recursive choice.) As we will show explicitly below, discounted logit is choice-loving in the sense of always preferring larger menus. Intuitively, this comes from the fact that each new object added to the menu provides another chance for a good realization of the random shock , as it does in any random utility model unless the shocks to some of the objects are perfectly correlated. 10 The case κ = 1 represents error-averse choice in the sense that the constant log |A t+1 | that the agent prefers not to add a new item to a singleton menu if it is worse than the current item (in the sense of being chosen less than half the time in the binary menu). More generally, the parameter κ is responsible for how heavily big sets are penalized and corresponds to the choice aversion ordering of agents introduced below. The role of κ and the special nature of κ = 1 are easier to see in the next two representations.
Definition 5. For any q ∈ ∆ n , let H n (q) := − n i=1 q i log(q i ) be the entropy of q with the convention that 0 log 0 = 0. Let J n κ (q) = H n (q) − κ log n be the adjusted entropy. Since the entropy and adjusted entropy are invariant to permutations, we treat distributions q ∈ ∆(A) as if they were elements of ∆ |A| when they are arguments of the functions H and J.
Definition 6 (Discounted Adjusted Entropy). P has a Discounted Adjusted Entropy (DAE) representation if and only if there exist a utility function v : Z → R, discount fac- 9 Ahn and Sarver (2013) connect deterministic choice over menus in period 0 with random choice from menus in period 1 but it is not clear how to extend this to allow for random choice in period 0. Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski, and Takeoka (2013) and Lu (2013) make a similar connection in a model with an objective state space, but likewise do not characterize random choice in period 0.
10 The standard nested logit model applies to a static choice of an item and so cannot directly address preferences over menus, but a similar issue arises there : If "purchase" is one nest and "not purchase" is another then in the limit of a very large set of goods almost everyone must purchase. Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) propose (but do not characterize) two alternative responses to this issue in a static model: either scale the variance of the extreme-value shocks with the number of goods in the menu, or add a term to the utility function that depends on various characteristics of the menu. This is similar in spirit to our choice-aversion adjustment.
tor δ ∈ (0, 1), choice aversion parameter κ, and value functions U t : A t → R recursively defined by U T (z) = v(z) and
such that for all t = 0, . . . , T and A t
Note that the entropy of the uniform distribution over n objects is log(n), which increases without bound in n. Hence a κ = 0 agent will prefer a menu of many roughly similar objects to the singleton menu with just one of them. We elaborate on the consequences of this below.
When κ = 1, the adjusted entropy is −R n (q), the negative of relative entropy of q with respect to the uniform distribution. This function is maximized in the interior of the simplex, so when κ = 1 stochastic choice can be interpreted as the result of costly attention: Choosing a uniform distribution is costless, but departing from it in the direction of a more desirable lottery is costly, with cost proportional to the relative entropy. Such an agent is error-averse, and prefers removing the lowest-ranked item from a menu, but is indifferent about whether an equally good item is added to a singleton menu. As the equivalent logit representation suggests, though, the error-averse preferences are consistent with a combination of consideration costs based on menu size and logit-type payoff shocks.
More generally, note that J n
is the relative entropy of q with respect to the uniform distribution. That is, adjusted entropy is a linear combination of entropy and relative entropy. Thus, adjusted entropy represents a combination of two motivations for random choice: desire for randomization (represented by the entropy term) and costly attention (represented by the negative relative entropy term). The third representation is perhaps the easiest to use in applications, as it incorporates the well-known "log-sum" representation of the logit value function. (see, e.g., Train, 2009, Chapter 3, or Lemma 3 in the Appendix) Definition 7 (Discounted Adjusted Luce). P has a Discounted Adjusted Luce (DALu) representation if there exists a utility function v : Z → R, discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), choice aversion parameter κ ∈ R, and value functions W t : A t → R ++ recursively defined by log W T (z) = v(z) and
.
Here, as in the static Luce case, the ratio of the choice probabilities of two items is given by the ratio of their weights; these weights now corresponds to a weighted sum of current payoff and the sum of the weights of the continuation menus, with menu size penalized by κ.
The following proposition states the equivalence of the three representations.
Proposition 1. The following statements are equivalent:
1. P has a DAL representation with parameters (v, δ, κ) and value functions U t .
2. P has a DAE representation with parameters (v, δ, κ) and value functions U t .
3. P has a DALu representation with parameters (v, δ, κ) and value functions W t = exp(U t ).
Moreover, if P has any of the above representations with parameters (v, δ, κ) and
The proof is in the Appendix (as are the proofs of all of the other propositions). In outline, the proof first notes that all three representations generate the same choice probabilities as logit in the static case and thus are equivalent in final period, and then uses the equivalence of the corresponding value functions for final-period menus to work backwards. The reason that αv is not equivalent to v in DAL, as opposed to the usual affine uniqueness of expected utility, is that we set the parameter of the extreme value distribution to 1, which fixes the multiplicative term in the utility function; this parallels our specification of a unit coefficient for adjusted entropy in DAE and of W = exp(1 · v) in DALu. Uniqueness of δ is as in the deterministic choice literature, and uniqueness of κ follows from the period-t choices between singleton menus at period t + 1 and arbitrary two-element menus. Motivated by this proposition, we refer to the three representations collectively as discounted adjusted representations, or DARs.
Definition 8 (Discounted Adjusted Representation). P has a DAR if it has a DAL, DAE, or a DALu representation.
Applications

Work or College?
To illustrate our setup, consider the following example of a high school student's choice of whether or not to go to college, which we adapt from Train (2009, Chapter 7) . There are two periods. In period 0 the student can either go to college, which leads to immediate outcome c, or work, which leads to immediate outcome w. In addition to immediate outcomes, her choices in period 0 have consequences for the sets of options available in period 1: If the student works in period 0, she must work in job z in period 1 and if the student goes to college in period 0, she will choose between two jobs x and y. Thus, the student faces the decision depicted in Figure 1 . To represent this decision tree as one of our dynamic choice problems, let A 1 = {x, y} and B 1 = {z} be the two possible continuation problems in period 1 (after choosing to go to college or not). Then the time zero choice problem is A 0 = {(c, A 1 ), (w, B 1 )}. We write P 0 [(c, A 1 )|A 0 ] to denote the probability that the student chooses to go to college in period 0 and P 1 [x|A 1 ] to denote the probability that in period 1 (conditional on having gone to college) the student chooses a job x.
Suppose that the v is the utility function of the agent, so that for example the utility of outcome c is v(c). Under any of the DARs, the value of the continuation choice problem A 1 is log e v(x) + e v(y) − κ log 2 and the probability of choosing job
. Using the formula from DALu it is immediate that the probability that the student goes to college is
Here the the log 2 term reflects the fact that going to college leads to two future options. When κ < 1 the term has positive weight, corresponding to an agent who likes to have choices, perhaps due to the perceived option value; when κ > 1 the log 2 term has negative weight, corresponding to an agent who is choice-averse. When κ = 1 the log 2 term vanishes so the agent is indifferent about adding an equally good choice to the menu.
Durable Goods
This stylized example shows how the model of individual demand for durable goods proposed by Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) fits into our framework. In period t = 0 there are two durable goods available: x and y; in period t = 1 there is only one durable good z available. In this environment, the customer also cares about the price of each good, so in our setting the outcomes available in each period are pairs (good, price), for example (x, p x ). 11
In period t = 0 the agent chooses between x and y. She will receive the flow of utility of that choice in t = 0 as well as in t = 1, unless she decides to replace it with z. For example, purchasing x at price p x corresponds to the action a = ((x, p x ), A 1 ): the agent receives x in period 0 and pays the price p x ; in period 1 the agent has a choice from the menu A 1 = {(x, 0), (z, p z )}: not making any purchases and continuing to receive x, or making a new purchase z and paying the price p z . Likewise, purchasing y at price p y corresponds to the action b = ((y, p y ), B 1 ), where Like us, Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) suppose that the individual is uncertain about their own future choices and moreover that this uncertainty is symmetric between the agent and the analyst. In addition they make the same functional form assumptions that we do: They assume that in period 1 the utility of the outcome (x, 0) is v(x) + x,1 , the utility of (y, 0) is v(y) + y,1 , and the utility of (z, r) is v(z) − r + z,1 , where x,1 , y,1 , z,1 ∼ iid EV (1). Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) assume that preferences are discounted logit; in particular they assume that the taste shocks in period 0 and period 1 are independent and that the period 1 shock is not revealed until the beginning of period 1. Thus their model corresponds to DAR with κ = 0, so from the agent's t = 0 perspective the value of menu A 1 is
As a result the probability that the agent purchases x in period 0 is
Magazine Subscriptions
Our framework can be also used to model choices that influence the future opportunities to make decisions, such as choosing between liquid and illiquid assets, purchasing or renting a car, or whether to get a cellphone with or without a contract. For example, suppose that an agent is contemplating buying a magazine subscription; if the agent does not buy the subscription, she will have to decide whether to purchase each issue separately. For simplicity, we abstract from pricing (since subscriptions offer cost savings, this force would push the agent in the direction of buying the subscription). We focus instead on another aspect of the problem: since every issue differs, even if in expectation the magazine is worth buying, there may be weeks when it's not. Thus, not having a subscription offers an option value. On the other hand, the agent may be choice averse and may prefer to make the decision once and for all, instead of having to decide every week. As we will see, in our model the strength of this force is measured by the parameter κ.
To illustrate this in a simple model, suppose that in period t = 0 the agent makes the subscription decision and in periods t = 1, 2 she makes decisions about buying individual issues should she choose not to subscribe. Let x denote 'consuming' the magazine and denote not consuming it. The agent faces the dynamic decision problem depicted in Figure 3 . 
Then the probability of skipping the purchase of an issue of the magazine is the same in every period and equals
which is increasing in d. With this parametrization, buying the subscription has value U 0 (b 0 ) = d, whereas not buying the subscription has value U 0 (n 0 ) = d+δ log e d+δ(log(1+e)−κ log 2) + e δ(log(1+e)−κ log 2) − κ log 2 = d+(δ+δ 2 ) log 1 + e d 2 κ .
Thus, the agent will buy the subscription with probability more than .5 iff her choice aversion parameter κ is above the threshold
Note that κ * is increasing in π, which can thus be seen as a measure of the option value of not locking in to the subscription: the higher the probability of skipping the single issue purchase, the stronger the choice aversion has to be to compensate for the forgone flexibility.
As we show in Section 5, it is true more generally that the parameter κ measures how the agent trades off flexibility and decision costs. The ability to quantify this tradeoff may be helpful in applied work studying choices about subscriptions and other choices influencing the future opportunities to make decisions, such as those mentioned in Section 4.
Comparative Statics
Choice Aversion
We now introduce a partial order that allows us to compare how agents feel about adding items to a menu.
Definition 9 (Choice Aversion). Agent 2 is more choice averse than agent 1 if for all menus
Proposition 2. Consider any two DARs P with parameters (v, δ, κ), and P * with parameters (v, δ, κ * ). Then, P is more choice averse than P * if κ ≥ κ * . The converse is true under the Richness axiom (Axiom 5) introduced in Section 6.
Intuitively, this is true because higher κ means that bigger sets are penalized more heavily. The parameter κ also determines the conditions under which the agent wants to add an item to a menu, that is, when A t+1 ∪ {b t+1 } t A t+1 : the higher the κ, the more "choosy" the agent.
Proposition 3. For any DAR with parameter κ and b t+1 /
Thus if κ = 0 the agent always wants to add new items. If κ = 1 the agent only wants to add a new item if it is chosen with more than uniform probability, which fits with the interpretation that stochastic choice arises from a cost of preventing errors. This provides an easy way to distinguish κ = 0 from κ = 1 (assuming that the model is correct with one of these two values): It is sufficient to observe the agent's choice between the menu {a t+1 , a t+1 } and the menu {a t+1 }, where P t [a t+1 |{a t+1 , a t+1 }] = 0.5. Moreover, by observing the agent's choice probabilities between n pairs of menus, we can determine to which of n + 1 subintervals the agent's value of κ belongs. 12 The next proposition provides further information on the implications of various values of κ by linking them to stochastic versions of axioms in the literature on preferences over menus: Kreps (1979) ; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) ; Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) ; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009) .
Proposition 4. Suppose that P is a DAR. Then
Of course, data on a finite set of menus could never prove that the representation also fit choices from menus that have not been observed. For this reason, our representation theorem in Section 6 places restrictions on choice from every menu; the theorem tells us just what conditions these choices must satisfy to be consistent with the representation.
Immediate vs. Delayed Consequences
Dynamic choice problems also let us study how choices depend on whether their consequences are immediate or delayed. For example, suppose that the decision maker chooses x with probability .51 from the menu {x, y}, as in Figure 4 . What will the decision maker do if asked to make the choice between x and y one period before they can be consumed, i.e., what is the probability of choosing the action a = (z, {x}) over b = (z, {y})? As noted above, DAL assigns shocks to all actions, even those without any immediate payoff consequences. At the time of the decision the agent does not know the particular shocks that apply to x and y tomorrow. However, even though the menu {x} is in expectation strictly better than {y}, the agent's choice between a and b is stochastic, as both actions receive independent payoff shocks today.
One obvious alternative model would be one where shocks are only to consumption. With the usual i.i.d. shocks assumption, that model predicts deterministic choice regardless of the real time that elapses between the choice and its consumption consequence in the next period. This stark conclusion strikes us as a significant drawback. The intermediate case where information about consumption shocks is gradually revealed over time would yield less stark predictions, but it seems too complicated to work with except in extremely simple problems.
Horizon Effects
A related phenomenon is the relationship between the length of the delay and choice. How do the choice probabilities change when the consequences recede into the future? Are choices over later rewards more random than choices over sooner rewards? What happens in the limit? Let A be a subset of Z. Suppose the agent will receive a fixed sequencez = (z 0 , z 1 , ..., z T −1 ) in periods 0 through T −1, and that the only non-trivial decision (non-singleton choice problem) that the agent faces is to decide in time 0 whichz T to receive at time T . Thus, the agent's time-0 decision problem is to choose between |A| different continuation problems, one for each element of A.
, the choice probability of a given elementz T .
Discounting implies that the agent becomes less concerned about a choice as its consequences recede into the future, and so under DAR in the limit choice over distant rewards is close to the uniform distribution. To see that, note that if the agent picksz T , his period-T utility is v(z T ), and his value in period 0 is U 0 (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z T −1 ,z T ) = T −1 t=0 δ t v(z t ) + δ T v(z T ). Thus, the agent's choice at time 0 is
Note that even though the initial differences between the utilities of items of A may be large, discounting makes them closer to each other, which leads to more uniform choice probabilities. In the limit, as T → ∞ we have P 0 [(z 0 , z 1 , ..., z T −1 ,z T )|A 0 ] → 1 |A| .
Choosing When to Choose
A concomitant question about timing is when the agent would like to make a choice from a given menu, with the outcome to be received at some later time.
Let A be a subset of Z with a generic elementz T . Suppose that the agent must choose between a 0 = (z 0 , A 1 ) and b 0 = (z 0 , B 1 ) at time 0. Under either decision problem, he will receive the same sequence (z 1 , . . . , z T −1 ) in periods 0 through T − 1. Under A 1 , he will face a choice in period 1 of which elementz T to receive at time T , while under B 1 he selects his time-T outcomẽ z T ∈ A in period T . Figure 5 shows a simple problem of this kind; we are interested whether a 0 0 b 0 or vice versa. The following result shows that the timing decisions of the agent depend on his choice aversion parameter κ: agents who are more choice loving have a stronger preference for making earlier decisions; agents who are more choice averse have a stronger preference for making later decisions.
Proposition 5.
1. Fix any two DAR choice rules (v, δ, κ) and (v, δ, κ * ). If a 0 0 b 0 and κ > κ * , then a 0 * 0 b 0 . If b 0 0 a 0 and κ * > κ, then b 0 * 0 a 0 .
2. If κ ≤ 0, then a 0 0 b 0 for any menu A. If κ ≥ 1, then b 0 0 a 0 for any menu (with indifference if and only if κ = 1 and all the elements of the set A are chosen with equal probabilities).
An agent with κ = 0 always likes to make an early choice. Under DAE she derives a benefit (measured by the entropy function) from the simple act of choice, and impatience implies she would like to receive this benefit as early as possible. Under DAL the reason the agent prefers early resolution when κ = 0 is that the payoff shocks t apply to pairs (z t , A t+1 ) of current action and continuation plan, and since the expected value of the shock of the chosen action is positive, the agent again prefers early choice. This perhaps unintuitive result is a consequence of two key assumptions: first, that there are utility shocks to actions as opposed to shocks to consumption utility (as is needed to generate stochastic choice over any act that involves delayed consumption, such as purchasing cans of tuna fish) and second, that the desirability of future menus includes all of the "option value" that the utility shocks suggest. The adjustment embodied in the parameter κ lets the model keep the analytic simplicity of aid shocks to actions while reducing or eliminating this option value. For example, when κ ≥ 1 the menu-size adjustment is so large that the agent perceives the act of choice as a "bad." Then, because the agent is impatient and so prefers to postpone losses, a κ ≥ 1 agent has a preference for later choice. This provides a way to identify κ without using menus of different sizes (again on the assumption that the representation applies). 13 Some additional intuition for the link between κ and preference over the timing of choice can be obtained by noticing that the value function in DALu expresses the value today as a nonlinear function of the choice probabilities tomorrow. This function resembles the formulation of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and especially the functional form of Epstein and Zin (1989) , with the difference that in those models the randomization is exogenous, while here the randomization is a consequence of the actions of the agent herself. When κ = 1, our agent has preferences toward late resolution of uncertainty because the nonlinear transformation of the probabilities is concave; here the adjusted log-sum formula can be interpreted as a certainty equivalent.
Axiomatization
We present the axioms in three subsections. The axioms in the first subsection simply ensure that preferences reduce to the logit case in a static problem and that preferences are independent of any fixed continuation problem, which also implies that preferences over today's outcomes with a fixed continuation problem reduce to logit. The second subsection develops axioms that relate choices at times t and t+1, and pin down how the agent feels about replicating the objects in each menu. These axioms are sufficient to obtain recursive versions of DAR, in which choice at time t depends on the utility of time-t outcomes and a continuation value. However, just as in deterministic dynamic choice (Koopmans, 1960) , additive, stationary, impatient representations require additional assumptions that we develop in the third subsection.
Logit-esque Axioms
Axiom 1 (Positivity). For any t, A t ∈ M t and a t ∈ A t we have P t [a t | A t ] > 0.
As argued by McFadden (1973) , a zero probability is empirically indistinguishable from a positive but small probability, and since keeping all probabilities positive facilitates estimation, the positivity axiom is usually assumed in econometric analysis of both static and dynamic 13 Of course adopting κ > 0 means rejecting the strong form of preference for flexibility in which larger menus are always preferred. We feel that such preference is as counterintuitive as a preference for always deciding early, as we would prefer a menu with one great choice to a menu with the great choice and several awful ones. discrete choice. In settings where the stochastic term arises from random utility, positivity corresponds to the assumption that the utility shocks have sufficiently large support that even a typically unattractive option is occasionally preferred. Positivity is implied by the perturbed objective function representation for stochastic choice when the gradient of the perturbation becomes infinite on the boundary of the probability simplex; it has been motivated there by the fact that no deterministic rule can be Hannan (or "universally") consistent.
whenever the probabilities in the denominators are both positive.
Stage IIA says that the ratio of choice probabilities between two actions, does not depend on other actions in the menu; it reduces to the standard IIA axiom in period T by our assumption that choices do not depend on past history. Notice that positivity and IIA imply that the stochastic preference t is transitive (see, e.g., Luce, 1959) . As is well known, this axiom is very restrictive. As we noted in the Introduction, it and the closely related logistic choice rule are widely used in empirical work for reasons of tractability. Assuming IIA lets us focus on other aspects of stochastic dynamic choice; we discuss some of the issues related to relaxing this assumption in Section 7.
Axiom 3 (Ordinal Time Separability). For all t < T , x, y ∈ Z, and A t+1 , B t+1 ∈ M t+1 1.
(
This axiom says that preferences over future decision problems are independent of the outcome in the current period, and conversely that preferences over current outcomes do not depend on the choice problem to be confronted tomorrow. 14 It is thus a stochastic version of Postulate 3 of Koopmans (1960) , and corresponds to what Fishburn (1970, Chapter 4) calls independence. Axiom 3 together with the recursivity axiom of Section 6.2 is sufficient for a history-independent recursive representation of the agent's preferences (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix.)
14 Since at least one reader asked us whether Axioms 1 and 2 imply Axiom 3, we point out that Axiom 3 fails if preference has logistic choice with the following specification:
for some functions u and v.
Tying Choices in Different Time Periods
Now we introduce axioms that relate choices in period t to choices and menus in the consecutive time period. The next axiom requires that future choice problem A is more likely to be selected now than some other B if elements of A are more likely to be selected than elements of B when both are presented as an immediate decision next period. Note well that this axiom only applies when A and B have the same size-for this reason it does not constrain how the agent feels about adding items to a menu.
Axiom 4 (Recursivity). For all t and menus
We need additional axioms to pin down choices across menus of different sizes. Before stating these axioms, we present some others that help shed light on the role of κ in the representations. The next axiom simply drops the qualifier |A t+1 | = |B t+1 | from recursivity:
Axiom (Aggregate Recursivity). For all t and menus
This axiom is satisfied by DAR with κ = 0. At first sight it might seem to require no more than that the agent is sophisticated, as it is a stochastic version of the temporal consistency axiom of Kreps and Porteus (1978) , which requires that a future choice problem A is selected now over some other B if there exists an element of A which is selected over any element of B when both are presented as an immediate decision next period. 15 Another noteworthy case is κ = 1, which corresponds to the discounted relative entropy model. This is captured by "average recursivity," which says that choice problem A is more likely to be selected now then some other B if the average of the choice probabilities of elements of A is higher than that of B when the choice set tomorrow is the union of A and B.
Axiom (Average Recursivity). For all t and menus
We will now state an axiom that leads to a representation with an arbitrary value of κ. To do so, we need a technical condition to ensure that the domain of preference is suitably large.
Axiom 5 (Richness). For any t ≤ T , action (z, A t+1 ) ∈ Z × M t+1 , finite set of outcomes Z ⊆ Z, and λ ∈ (0, ∞) there exists an outcome z λ ∈ Z \ Z , such that
In the case λ = 1 we say that z and z 1 are "equivalents." By Richness, there are arbitrarily many equivalents of each outcome. An equivalent of an action (z, A t+1 ) is any action of the form (z 1 , A t+1 ) where z 1 is an equivalent of z. Let A t+1 ∈ M t+1 and n be an integer. We say that a menu A t+1 is an n-replica of A t+1 whenever for each a ∈ A t+1 the menu A t+1 contains n equivalents of a and |A t+1 | = n|A t+1 |. We denote by n * A t+1 any n-replica of A t+1 ; each such replica is treated equivalently by the agent.
Axiom 6 (Replica Invariance). For any t ≤ T , outcomes x, y ∈ Z, continuation menus
To understand this axiom, suppose that A t+1 = {a} and B t+1 = {b, c}. Then the agent is sure to end up with an equivalent of a when choosing from n * A t+1 , and as a consequence of Stage IIA the probability of a choosing an equivalent of b when choosing from n * B t+1 is the same as the probability of choosing b from B t+1 , so that the probability ratio of the two is the same in both cases. Thus the one reason that the two ratios might be different is because of the effect of menu size per se: For example if the agent likes menus of size 1 much more than those of any other size, it might be that Pt[(x,A t+1 )|Ct]
Pt [(x,B t+1 )|Ct] > Pt[(y,n * A t+1 )|Ct] Pt[(y,n * B t+1 )|Ct] . The axiom rules this out, and requires instead that the menu-size effect depends multiplicatively on the number of replicas.
Stationarity and Impatience
To obtain a more specific and more tractable representation we first impose an axiom that ensures that the effect of moving a decision from period t + 1 to period t depends only on the period t + 1 probabilities, and not the identities of the actions.
Axiom 7 (Probability Equivalence). For any t < T, a t+1 , b t+1 , c t+1 , d t+1 ∈ A t+1 and x, y ∈ Z
The axioms we have developed so far are sufficient to characterize a version of DAR where the value is a discounted sum but where various terms such as the discount factor or utility functions can vary over time. To obtain a stationary discounted model, we also need an axiom to ensure that the discount factor and utility functions are time invariant. The original form of stationarity introduced by Koopmans (1960) relies on an infinite horizon; we use a similar axiom of Fishburn (1970, Chapter 7) . The axiom is imposed on the period zero preference over consumption streams (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z T ) that is induced from 0 by appropriately defining A T := {z T }, and recursively A t−1 = {(z t−1 , A t )} for t = T − 1, . . . , 0.
Axiom 8 (Stream Stationarity). For any z, z 1 , . . . , z T , z 1 , . . . , z T ∈ Z (z, z 1 , . . . , z T ) 0 (z, z 1 , . . . , z T ) iff (z 1 , . . . , z T , z) 0 (z 1 , . . . , z T , z).
In conjunction with the previous axioms, the next axiom ensures that the way the agent chooses between menus of different cardinality does not depend on the time period.
Axiom 9 (Stationary Choice Aversion). For any t < T , outcome z ∈ Z and continuation
Finally, Impatience says that the agent prefers receiving better outcomes earlier on and so ensures that the discount factor is less than one.
Axiom 10 (Impatience). For any z, z , z 0 , . . . , z T ∈ Z if (z, . . . , z) 0 (z , . . . , z ), then (z 0 , . . . , z t−1 , z, z , z t+2 , . . . , z T ) 0 (z 0 , . . . , z t−1 , z , z, z t+2 , . . . , z T ). The proof of Theorem 1 follows three main steps.
Representation Theorem
Step 1: Lemma 4 shows that Axioms 1-3 are equivalent to a "sequential Luce representation:" there are weights W t for actions a t such that
Here our maintained assumption that P t is history independent and Axioms 1 and 2 let us use Luce's original argument to conclude there are weights that describe period-t choice, and Axiom 3 then lets us mimic the proof of Koopmans' Proposition 3 and conclude that
where G t is a strictly increasing function of the utility v t (z t ) and "anticipated utility" h t (A t+1 ).
Step 2: Lemma 5 shows that adding Recursivity implies that the function h t is of the form
where f n t is a family of increasing functions that depend on the cardinality n of the menu.
Step 3: The final step is to show that Richness, Replica Invariance, and Probability Equivalence imply that P has a DAR with time-dependent parameters (v t , δ t , κ t ). Finally, Stream Stationarity, Stationary Choice Aversion, and Impatience imply that the parameters are timeinvariant.
Discussion
Relation to the Literature
The paper is related to quite a large number of others, as it draws on and extends the literature on static stochastic choice pioneered by Luce (1959) , Marschak (1959), and Harsanyi (1973a) , the literature on discounting representations of deterministic dynamic choice (notably Koopmans, 1960) , and the literature on choices over menus pioneered by Kreps (1979) .
We have maintained the widely used but widely criticized IIA assumption. While empirical analyses of dynamic choice continue to use IIA, empirical work on static choice uses alternatives such as nested logit and BLP (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) that avoid some of IIA's starkest implications. Similarly, the theoretical work of Falmagne (1978) , Barberá and Pattanaik (1986) , Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2012) provides axiomatic characterizations of static random utility models without the IIA assumption. Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2012) is of particular note here, as they characterize an analog of nested logit that allows for items to be perfect, as opposed to almost-perfect, substitutes, which eliminates any "option value" that arises from adding exact substitutes to a menu. Moreover, in a recent addition to their paper, they extend their characterization to dynamic choice problems in which consumption occurs in a single time period and the agent is completely patient and so insensitive to the timing of payoffs and decisions. Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2013) provide axiomatic characterizations of stochastic choice by an ambiguity-averse agent as a form of non-linear perturbed utility without assuming IIA, thus generalizing the entropy functional form to other perturbations; they also provide a characterization of nested logit. This work suggests that our dynamic representations could also be generalized beyond IIA, though obtaining a model of recursive choice problems that is both general and tractable seems challenging.
In recent years there have been several generalizations of Koopmans (1960) 's characterization to forms of "behavioral" dynamic choice, as in Jackson and Yariv (2010) and Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014); introducing stochastic choice into those setups could be a useful tool for analyzing experimental results.
The most active related literature is that on choice between menus. Some of these papers develop representations motivated by "consideration costs" or "costs of thinking;" to the extent that this cost is increasing in the menu size it is related to our representations. Ergin and Sarver (2010) , following Ergin (2003) , develop a representation with a double maximization, in which "costly contemplation" corresponds to buying a signal about the second-period attractiveness of the various options. Though their primitives do not include lotteries over menus, they motivate their work with the idea that the agent prefers that such lotteries are resolved before she chooses an alternative so that she can avoid formulating a complete contingent plan. This motivation seems related to our comparative statics (Proposition 5) about choice aversion and preference for late decisions. Ortoleva (2011) explicitly considers lotteries and develops a model of "cost of thinking" where the agent ranks lotteries over menus as if she expected to choose the best option from each of them.
Other recent papers on choice from menus are of interest here primarily for how they impose recursivity or dynamic consistency. Ahn and Sarver (2013) is perhaps closest, as like this paper it treats both initial choice of a menu and subsequent choice from it as observable. They use recursivity axioms to pin down a unique state space and probabilities in the two-stage menu choice model; their Axiom 1 is similar in spirit to our Aggregate Recursivity condition, but as stated it is vacuously satisfied given our positivity assumption. 16 Krishna and Sadowski (2014) provide two representations for a decision maker who is uncertain about his future utility in an infinite-horizon decision problem. Their stationarity axiom corresponds to our Axioms 3 and 8, but Recursivity is inconsistent with the indifference required by their "continuation strategic rationality" axiom though they do assume the agent prefers larger menus.
The paper is also related to the use of non-linear perturbed utility in the theory of nonequilibrium learning in static games, as in Fudenberg and Levine (1995) , Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) , Hofbauer and Hopkins (2005) , Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) , and Fudenberg and Takahashi (2011) . Fudenberg and Levine (1995) show that this generates a choice rule that is Hannan consistent, meaning that the decision maker gets at least the payoff that would be obtained from maximizing against the long-run average of play by Nature and any other players (Hannan, 1957) . One motivation for this paper is to extend that work to allow for dynamic considerations, such as would arise in learning to play an extensive-form game.
Conclusion
This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of three equivalent generalizations of discounted logit, namely discounted adjusted logit, discounted adjusted entropy, and discounted adjusted Luce. These representations include a choice-aversion parameter that captures the link between choices in different periods by adjusting the implied "option value" of larger menus. We point out that discounted logit is the special case of κ = 0, where the agent always prefers adding any item to any menu. In this case the agent also has a preference for early decision, which highlights the fact that a preference for larger menus can arise for many reasons, of which Kreps (1979) 's preference for flexibility as usually understood is only one; this indicates the benefit of considering a richer decision domain than that in Kreps (1979) . The more general discounted adjusted logit penalizes larger menus and so reduces the value of making early decisions: As κ increases, the agent is less attracted to larger menus and more inclined to delay decisions, and when κ ≥ 1 the agent always prefers to put decisions off.
The axiomatic characterization of our model provides a foundation for the inclusion of a choice-aversion parameter in empirical work. This representation is just as tractable as the usual discounted logit and may better describe behavior in at least some choice problems where the menu size varies.
To prove the proposition we use the well-known following lemmas. The first lemma can be found in Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992, Section 3.6) .
exp(x i ) and the solution is
The following lemma is an easy conclusion from Lemma 1
Lemma 2. For any vector (x 1 , . . . ,
exp(x i ) − κ log n and the solution is
The next lemma can be found in Train (2009, Chapter 3) .
Lemma 3. Suppose that 1 , . . . , n are i.i.d. random variables with the extreme value distribution with noise level parameter 1. For any vector (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n E max i=1,...,n
exp(x i ) and Prob x i + i ≥ max j=1,...,n
DAL equivalent to DALu
By Lemma 3, it follows that {P t } has a DAL representation iff
By letting W t = exp(U t ), this is equivalent to a DALu representation.
DAE equivalent to DALu
By Lemma 2, it follows that {P t } has a DAE representation iff
Uniqueness
Suppose that (v, δ, κ) and (v , δ , κ ) are both DALu representations of {P t }. The induced period zero choice between consumption streamsz = (z 0 , . . . z T ) (for the definition of consumption streams, see axiom Stationarity over Streams) has static Luce representations (Luce, 1959) 
By fixing (z 1 , . . . ,z T ) ∈ Z T this implies that there exists a constant β such that v(z 0 ) = v (z 0 ) + β for all z 0 ∈ Z. By fixing (z 0 ,z 2 , . . . ,z T ) ∈ Z T this implies that δ = δ.
Finally, consider A T −1 = {(z, {x}), (z, {y 1 , y 2 })} for some arbitrary x, y 1 , y 2 , z ∈ Z. We have
= exp(δv(x)) exp(δ log(e v(y 1 ) + e v(y 2 ) ) − δκ log 2) = exp(δv(x) + δβ) exp(δ log(e v(y 1 )+β + e v(y 2 )+β ) − δκ log 2) = exp(δv(x) + δβ) exp(δ log(e v(y 1 ) + e v(y 2 ) ) + δβ − δκ log 2) = exp(δv(x)) exp(δ log(e v(y 1 ) + e v(y 2 ) ) − δκ log 2) so κ = κ.
A.2 Recursive Representations
In this section we study recursive representations a la Koopmans (1960) and Kreps and Porteus (1978) . The representations we present here have fewer time-separability properties than a discounted sum and do not insist on stationarity, and therefore correspond to a shorter list of axioms. We use these representations as intermediate steps towards the main theorem.
Definition 10 (Sequential Luce). {P t } has a Sequential Luce Representation if there exists functions v t : Z → R, h t : M t+1 → R with ranges Rv t and Rh t respectively, and G t : Rv t × Rh t → R ++ , strictly increasing in both variables, and value functions W t :
such that for all A t and all a t ∈ A t
Definition 11 (Recursive Adjusted Luce). {P t } has a Recursive Adjusted Luce representation if it has a sequential Luce representation with
for some family of increasing functions f n t . Step 1: Fixz ∈ Z and define W T (z) := 1. For any other z ∈ Z define
For any A T = {z 1 , . . . , z n } ∈ M T , Positivity and Stage IIA imply that for all i, j = 1 . . . , n
so equation (8) holds. For t ≤ T we proceed analogously to define W t (z, A t+1 ) that satisfies equation (8).
Step 2: Part (1) of Ordinal Time Separability and Step 1 imply that for all z, z ∈ Z and
Fixz ∈ Z and define h t (A t+1 ) := W t (z, A t+1 ) for all A t+1 ∈ M t+1 . Property (10) implies that for any z ∈ Z there is a strictly increasing function f z t :
for any z ∈ Z and h ∈ Rh t . Note that the function F t is strictly increasing in the second variable. With this notation we have W t (z, A t+1 ) = F t (z, h t (A t+1 )).
Step 3: Part (2) of Ordinal Time Separability and Steps 1-2 imply that for all z, z ∈ Z and
Fixh ∈ Rh t and define v t (z) := F t (z,h). Property (11) implies that for any h ∈ Rh t there exists a strictly increasing function m h t :
for any v ∈ Rv t and h ∈ Rh t . Note that the function G t is strictly increasing in both variables. This implies equation (7). 17
A.3.2 Necessity
Positivity is immediate since the function W takes strictly positive values, and Stage IIA follows immediately from formula (8). To prove that the first part of Ordinal Time Separability holds we need to show that A t+1 ). To prove that the second part of Ordinal Time Separability holds we need to show
A.3.3 Surjectivity
Fix an arbitrary element (z t , A t+1 ) ∈ A t and let r := W t (z t , A t+1 ). For anyr ∈ (0, ∞) let λ :=r r . Richness implies that there exists (ẑ t , A t+1 ) ∈ A t such that
By Lemma 4,r
Sincer was chosen arbitrarily, the conclusion follows.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
The necessity of Recursivity is immediate. For sufficiency, note that by Lemma 4, {P t } has a sequential Luce representation. Fix a period t and an integer n. Let M n t+1 be the subset of all menus from M t+1 with cardinality n. Recursivity together with the sequential Luce representation imply that t restricted to M n t+1 is represented by A t+1 → a t+1 ∈A t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ). From the definitions of t and the sequential Luce representation, it follows that t restricted to M n t+1 is also represented by the function h t restricted to M n t+1 . Thus, there exists a strictly increasing function f n t such that for all
Step 3: Fix v = v . Equations (12) and (13) imply that for all r, r ∈ (0, ∞)
which implies that γ t (v, r) = γ t (v, r ) for all r, r . Let γ t (v) denote this common value. Thus,
Step 4: Fix r, r , λ ∈ (0, ∞) and let a t+1 , b t+1 , c t+1 , d t+1 ∈ M t+1 be such that W t+1 (a t+1 ) = r,
. Probability Equivalence implies that for any x, y ∈ Z,
Thus, for all v, v ∈ Rv t and all r, r , λ ∈ (0, ∞) we have
This and equation (14) imply that
Let v = v and r = 1, and define b t,v (r) := β t (v, r)/β t (v, 1). The equation above implies the Cauchy functional equation b t,v (λr) = b t,v (λ)b t,v (r). Since the function g 1 t (v, ·) is increasing, the function β t (v, ·) is increasing, so the function b t,v (·) is increasing and hence continuous at some point. By Theorem 3, Section 2.1 of Aczél (1966) , the only nonzero solutions of this equation are of the form b t,v (r) = r δt(v) for some δ t (v) > 0. Thus, equation (15) implies that λ δt(v) = λ δt(v ) and since λ is arbitrary, we have δ t (v) = δ t (v ) for all v, v ∈ (0, ∞). Let δ t > 0 denote their common value. Thus, b t,v (r) = r δt ; this implies that β t (v, r) = β t (v, 1)r δt . Define B(v) := β t (v, 1). We have proven that
Step 5: Equations (12) and (16) with k = 2, l = 1 imply that 2 γt(v) = 2 γt(v ) , which implies that γ t (v) = γ t (v ) for all v, v ∈ (0, ∞). Let γ t denote the common value. We have proven that g n t (v, r) = B t (v)r δt n γt .
Step 6: By definition in Step 1, equation (17) implies that G t (v, f n (r)) = g n t (v, r/n) = B t (v)r δt n γt−1 . Definev t (z) := log B t (v t (z)) and κ t := −(γ t − 1)/δ t . We have log W t (z t , A t+1 ) =v t (z t ) + δ t log a t+1 ∈A t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ) − δ t κ t log |A t+1 | (18)
Step 7: We claim next that the functionsv t are surjective. To see this, fix A t+1 ∈ M t+1 and let d := δ t a t+1 ∈A t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ) − δ t κ t log |A t+1 |. Lemma 4 and (18) imply that for any r ∈ (0, ∞) there exists z ∈ Z such that r = W t (z, A t+1 ) = exp (v t (z t ) + d). Thus, for any r ∈ R there exists z ∈ Z such thatv t (z) = r by letting r = exp(r + d).
Step 8: Given (18), the preference over consumption streams is represented bỹ
Let v :=v 0 and δ := δ 0 . From the proof of Theorem 7.5 of Fishburn (1970) 18 it follows that if Stream Stationarity is satisfied, thenv t ≡ v for all t and δ t = δ for all t.
Step 9: Given (18), and the stationarity of v and δ, the induced preference on consumption streams is represented byz → T t=0 δ t v(z t ), with (z, . . . , z) 0 (z , . . . , z ) if and only if v(z) > v(z ) and (z 0 , . . . , z t−1 , z, z , z t+2 , . . . , z T ) 0 (z 0 , . . . , z t−1 , z , z, z t+2 , . . . , z T ) if and only if v(z) + δv(z ) > v(z ) + δv(z). Thus, by Impatience, (v(z) − v(z ))(1 − δ) > 0, which implies that δ < 1.
Step 10: Let A 1 ∈ M 1 and A t+1 ∈ M t+1 for some t < T . Let d 1 := a 1 ∈A 1 W 1 (a 1 ), n 1 := |A 1 |, d t+1 := a t+1 ∈A t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ), and n t+1 := |A t+1 |. Stationary Choice Aversion implies that d δ 1 n −δκ 0 1 d δ 1 n −δκ 0 1 + (2d 1 ) δ (2n 1 ) −δκ 0 = d δ t+1 n −δκt t+1 d δ t+1 n −δκt t+1 + (2d t+1 ) δ (2n t+1 ) −δκt , which implies that κ 0 = κ t .
A.6 Proofs of Other Results
A.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
To see why this is true, suppose that A t+1 * t ( * t )B t+1 . Let m A := max q∈∆(A) q(a t+1 )U t+1 (a t+1 )+ H |A| (q) and m B = max q∈∆(B) q(a t+1 )U t+1 (a t+1 ) + H |B| κ * (q). Then
The above inequality holds if we replace κ * with κ as long as κ ≥ κ * .
To prove the converse, suppose that κ < κ * . By Richness, there exist A t+1 = {a t+1 } and B t+1 = {b t+1 , b t+1 } such that m A = m B − κ * log 2, so that A t+1 * B t+1 . If P were more choice averse than P * we would have A t+1 B t+1 . But m A < m B − κ log 2, so A t+1 ≺ B t+1 , a contradiction.
A.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Let n = |A t+1 | and note that A t+1 ∪ {b t+1 } t A t+1 whenever log e U (b t+1 ) + a t+1 ∈A t+1 e U (a t+1 ) − κ log(n + 1) > log a t+1 ∈A t+1 e U (a t+1 ) − κ log n iff 1 (n + 1) κ e U (b t+1 ) + a t+1 ∈A t+1 e U (a t+1 ) > 1 n κ a t+1 ∈A t+1 e U (a t+1 ) iff a t+1 ∈A t+1 e U (a t+1 ) e U (b t+1 ) + a t+1 ∈A t+1 e U (a t+1 ) < n κ (n + 1) κ iff P t+1 [b t+1 |A t+1 ∪ {b t+1 }] > 1 − n κ (n + 1) κ
A.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
For the proof we will use the DALu representation, noting that A t+1 t B t+1 iff
and that all of the weights W t+1 are positive. part 1: Suppose that κ ≥ 1 and A t+1 and B t+1 are disjoint. Then |A t+1 ∪ B t+1 | κ ≥ |A t+1 | κ + |B t+1 | κ since the function x → x κ is superadditive (see proof of Proposition 5). Suppose that A t+1 t B t+1 and add |A t+1 | κ a t+1 ∈A t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ) to each side of (*) to obtain (|A t+1 | κ + |B t+1 | κ ) a t+1 ∈A t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ) ≥ |A t+1 | κ a t+1 ∈A t+1 ∪B t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ). Thus A t+1 t B t+1 implies A t+1 t A t+1 ∪ B t+1 . Conversely, suppose κ < 1. By Richness there is a pair of actions a t+1 , b t+1 with 2 κ −1 2 κ < P t+1 [b t+1 |{a t+1 , b t+1 }] < 1 2 , so that {a t+1 } t {b t+1 }. Then by Proposition 3 {a t+1 , b t+1 } t {a t+1 }, which contradicts positive set betweenness. part 2: Suppose that κ ≤ 1 and A t+1 and B t+1 are disjoint. We have |A t+1 ∪B t+1 | κ ≤ |A t+1 | κ + |B t+1 | κ since the function x → x κ is subadditive (see proof of Proposition 5). A t+1 t B t+1 and add |B t+1 | κ b t+1 ∈B t+1 W t+1 (b t+1 ) to each side of (*) to obtain |B t+1 | κ a t+1 ∈A t+1 ∪B t+1 W t+1 (a t+1 ) ≥ (|A t+1 | κ +|B t+1 | κ ) b t+1 ∈B t+1 W t+1 (b t+1 ). Thus, A t+1 t B t+1 implies A t+1 ∪B t+1 t B t+1 . Conversely, suppose κ > 1. By Richness there exist actions a t+1 , b t+1 with 1 2 < P t+1 [a t+1 |{a t+1 , b t+1 }] < 2 κ −1 2 κ so that {a t+1 } t {b t+1 } and by Proposition 3 {b t+1 } t {a t+1, b t+1 }, which contradicts negative set betweenness. part 3: Follows from parts 1 and 2. parts 4 and 5: Suppose that κ ≤ 0. If A t+1 ⊇ B t+1 , then |A t+1 | −κ ≥ |B t+1 | −κ ; therefore,
. Conversely, suppose that κ > 0 and fix an arbitrary A t+1 . Since Richness implies that the range of the function W t+1 is (0, +∞), it follows that there exits b t+1 with P t+1 [b t+1 |A t+1 ∪ {b t+1 }] < 2 κ −1 2 κ , and from Proposition 3 it follows that A t+1 t A t+1 ∪ {b t+1 }.
A.6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
To see this formally, let F (T ) := T −1 t=1 δ t−1 v(z t ) be the value of intermediate consumption and note that the value of choosing early is v(z 0 ) + δ log z T ∈A exp F (T ) + δ T −1 v(z T ) − κ log |A| whereas the value of choosing late is v(z 0 ) + δ F (T ) + δ T −1 log z T ∈A exp v(z T ) − δ T −1 κ log |A| . Thus,
To show part (1), note that e (δ T −1 −1) log |A| < 1. Thus, a decrease in κ increases r. To show part (2), note that when κ = 0 , r > 1 follows from the facts that |A| ≥ 2, that with δ < 1 the function z → z δ T −1 is strictly concave, and that strictly concave functions that pass through zero are strictly subadditive. 19 The result for κ < 0 follows from part (1). When κ = 1, r ≤ 1 by Jensen's inequality since δ < 1 and the function z → z δ T −1 is strictly concave. The equality holds if and only if all the elements of A are equivalents. For κ > 1, r < 1 by part (1).
